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IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM AND PRIMITIVE
PROCESS PHILOSOPHY
BRUCE W. BROTHERSTON
WHEN psychology wished to discover the original psychic
equipment of humanity, it seemed the obvious method to go
to the earliest possible stage in the life of the individual and there,
where environmental influence is slightest, to question the untaught
mind by means of controlled stimuli. But such experimenting with
babes, valuable as it is for special knowledge, has inescapable draw-
backs as a method for discovering the given in mind. In the first
place it is recognized that environmental influence reaches back
into prenatal days. The constancy of the intra-uterine environment
seems to be a necessary condition for even the structural constancy
of the organism. But besides this the child can no more be said to
have the completed original equipment of normal human mind—if,
as the writer believes, there is such an entity—at birth than at
conception. Only upon passing through adolescence and reaching
normal adult life, is the individual mind finally endowed with its
given—with the original human psychic equipment. Then only
has experience come upon the power to be fully self-observant;
and then endowment and confused nurture are hopelessly scrambled.
But there is perhaps another method. A feeling may be justi-
fied that the ardent interest which recent philosophy has taken in
the mental attitudes of early man arises in a sense that we are here
present at the awakening of conation into its reflective phase, and
can observe the primal behavior of mind as finally rounded out.
At this point in the process of evolution, where conation first ar-
rived at the stage of reflection, where intellectual operation was
at its merest beginning, where the content of learning was too little
complex to confuse the forms of immediate feeling, modern research
has discovered an almost uniform mental attitude obtaining across
ages of time and in geographically segregated continents. A sug-
gestion moving behind philosophical interest may be this : "Here,
at the earliest attainable point in the experience of the race rather
than of the individual, we may find the unobstructed mind in touch
with reality in immediate feeling, or non-sensuous perception, of
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the gh'en. It was this which Rousseau felt in his slogan "Back to
Nature," but which in his day could not be fully understood.
Immediate or radical empiricism has been criticised on the
ground that, purporting to present the given—the most naive and
ingenuous beginning of experience—it has arrived at a view at the
extreme remove from common sense, more difficult for common
sense to grasp than the most intellectualized construction. But it
may be that this is so merely because common sense in the modern
world is no longer naive, however untrustworthy it may be, but is
loaded with sophistications infiltrated from the learned classes. The
truly naive view-point is the view-point not of modern but of prim-
itive common sense—if it should turn out that we have the means
of observing that view-point. The argument that a truly radical
or immediate empiricism would manifest the ingeniousness of com-
mon sense may perhaps be entirely in its favor. If it is possible to
discover the primitive mental attitude, we shall find it simply fol-
lowing conation as it showed itself in its given constituents when it
first arrived at the stage of reflection.
The non-sensuous perception of these given constituents is im-
mediate or radical empiricism. In another article^ the present writer
has treated the concept of the given to immediate empiricism. He
has there pointed out that James made next-to-next-ness, or con-
nexity, definitive of radical empiricism. But that article main-
tained that there are two things and not merely one constitutive of
the immediately given. It pointed out that besides the connexity,
James found feelings of tendency upon the same empirical basis;
which, it argued, plainly include the religious total-conservation-of-
value-fecling and the scientific nccessity-of-unity-fceling. James
made such feelings of tendency the basis of his limited pragmatism,
and he did not find place for them any more than for pragmatism
in his more profound empiricism. But the relation could not and
did not fail to suggest itself and was bound ultimately to work
through against the obstacles it had to encounter. It was thus held,
in that article, that there are two levels or poles in the given to re-
flective conation or si)iritual urgency; one, that of process, and the
other, that of unity in any and all stages of inclusion.
We shall attempt to show in this article that it is possible to ar-
rive at the primitive human mental attitude and that in the primi-
177/.- Jounuil of I'hilnsophy, Vol. XXX, No. 6. Maicli 16, 1933.
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tive mental attitude both these poles of reflective conation or spir-
itual urgency are at once obvious. This will appear, we believe, as
we trace the beginnings of historic philosophy in their relations to
prehistoric mental attitudes. It is significant that James himself
saw that his radical empiricism is precisely Buddhism. The prin-
ciple boasted as Gautama's original contribution was called "de-
pendent origination." It is precisely the principle of connexity
moving and arriving from below sense-experience. To use James'
language regarding his own method, "It explores the way in which
the parts of experience hold together from next to next by rela-
tions that are themselves parts of experience."^ In Buddhism and
Sankhya we have immediate empiricism reporting the movement
of conation below the level of sense perception. The balance of
psychic tendencies (the three gunas) is disturbed, and an eddy of
desire (a vriti), a feeling of tendency, is set up which gives rise to
sensed objects (bitddhi, "name and form").
There is no doubt that James felt his kinship with Buddhism be-
cause of this immediate empiricism by non-sensuous perception get-
ting at the basis of reality, perceiving causality or origination at
work. But Buddhism was like James in another regard also : it
discarded the unities of soul and of thing, and this was another
strong likeness. Gautama took his position for the practical end
of escaping attachment to desires and of attaining salvation from
suffering; James, to oust a spurious theory of knowledge which
had been made the basis of a pernicious metaphysical determinism.
The difference is significant for it gave James a prejudice against
expansive unities but left Gautama free. The latter denied the
soul, was non-commital about Brahma at least as to what consti-
tuted it, but he posited the unity of returning cycles.
I have been told that it is generally recognized by scholars that
Buddhism was a reaction to a more primitive mental attitude ; and
this intuition can now, I think, be set out in some detail. In the
first place the notion of dependent origination was not, as Buddhism
claims, an original contribution of Gautama, but it was a position
of primitive mind, discoverable in ancient and modern pre-civilized
races, prevalent in the vedas and the upanishads and, mingled with
some fancy, taking different forms in Gautama's day. Again the
unity of the world cycle, an essential doctrine of Buddhism, is the
^The Meaning of Truth, Preface, p. 13.
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most primitive form of unity that held the human mind as we shall
later attempt to show. So that we may find here convincing evi-
dence that both connexity (dependent origination) and widest unity
are thoroughly primitive notions. They arose with the rise of the
power of reflection but before there was any sufficient practise of
reflection upon sense forms to make it possible to explain unity as
conscious synthesis. They were grasped by Bergsonian intuition,
non-sensuous perception, and they lead us to the two inescapable
motifs of philosophy,—the principles of multiplicity and of unity
at their common source in "the deep ground of the given."
We shall point out first the quite obvious pre-Buddhistic source
of the notion of dependent origination. The formula repeats itself
in two forms in the Buddhistic sacred books and \Varren says that
"One is inclined to surmise that the full formula in its present shape
is a piece of patchwork put together of two or more that were cur-
rent in the Buddha's time."^ One need not labor the matter when
he is merely affirming that not alone in Buddhism but also in pre-
Buddhistic literature, the upanishads and the vedas, there is a con-
stant reference to the merging and flux of process as more signifi-
cant of reality than the hard outlines of perceived and conceived
forms."* The question of Gargi to Yagnavalkya carries one at once
deep!}' into the atmosphere of the upanishads. It is the question
of an inner unbroken process. She said: "O Yagnavalkya, that of
which they say that it is above the heavens, beneath the earth, em-
bracing heaven and earth, past, present and future, tell me in what
it is woven like warp and woof." He replies that it is woven like
warp and woof in the ether (space) and that the ether is woven
like warp and woof in the "Imperishable" which he calls "that
^Buddhism in Translations by H. C. Warren, Harvard Oriental Series,
p. 115.
*But while the conception of dependent origination is precisely that of
process in modern immediate empiricism, no one would affirm that Buddhistic
formulae or upanishadic description present any consistent analysis of the
flow of process. That, as consistently pursued for its own sake, is an enter-
prise of recent philosophy alone. In Indian accounts of process, fancy is
mixed with intuition in many varied ways. The purpose of Indian thought
is attained in a clear general conception of process which sets it over against
perceived and conceived separate objects and individuals (name and form) as
the source and being of these. Ancient India then turns to practical methods,
as in Yoga, to realize this basic fact by expunging the obsession of reality
that attaches to "name and form." This purp<ise operating in their analysis
vitiates it as a scientific account. For a technical Buddhistic analysis of
process in the production of an individual, see Warren, op. cit. Appendix.
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Brahman." He is speaking of the inner unified process from which
issue all forms. "By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi,
sun and moon stand apart . . . heaven and earth stand apart . . .
what we call days and nights, half-months, months, seasons, years,
stand apart. By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, men
praise those who give, the Gods follow the sacrifices, the Fathers,
the Darvi-offering."-'
Understanding this "Imperishable Brahman" as inner process.
Buddhism never departed from the upanishadic position. Bud-
dism, except in one only of its forms, never denied Brahman. It
denied that atman or purusha, the individual soul, is Brahman and
it was non-committal as to what Brahman is ; but as to unified
process as the basis of all, it affirmed it: the path (of process) is
real.^ But the conception of unity retained in Buddhism is our
next topic. The present point is that process, which is the regu-
lative notion in Buddhistic philosophy, is not less prominent in the
upanishads. A list of the passages in the upanishadic literature in
which fancy plays with the derivation of "name and form" from
the deeper flux of process would not be short.''^ Moreover the merg-
ing of all separate elements of sense and intellect in a real self
(which was repudiated by Gautama) presents innumerable passages
in which a similar merging is conceived;^ being unified as self is an-
other matter. Indeed it is unified now as Self and now as Brahma,
as subjective and objective moods may alternate; and Buddhism,
as we have said, did not repudiate Brahman.
We go back another step in tracing the notion of process into
the early world. The divine fire (Agni) is conceived as real inner
process behind the outward forms, and in its operation reducing
the outward appearances to inner reality. Fire is the substantial
principle of becoming in the vedas as in Heraclitus. Men place
Agni on the altar as the augmentor of strength.^ That is to say,
the sacrificial fire turns the thing sacrificed into its inner reality
which "feeds the Gods" ; or, more expressively, "increases the
Rita," or the order of nature. "The Marruts, who give rain, the
SBrih. Up. Ill, 8, 7-12. Cf. Ill, 6.
^Yisudfjhi-Magga (chap. XVI) quoted in Warren, op. cit., p. 146.
7See, for instance Kand. Up. VI, 3, 2ff ; Brih. Up. I, 4, 6 and 7 ; I, 6, 3
;
Mund. Up. I. 1, 9: Tait. Up. II, 7.
SKath. Up. II, 4, 14. 15; Tait. Up. II, 8, 5 ; I, 1 ; Brih. Up. IV, 4, 5ff;
Mund. Up. I, 1, 9, etc., etc.
9R. V. 1, 36, 2.
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fire-tongued (lightning) incr^asers of Rita."^^ Fire is the process
of burning up the merely seeming and of increasing reality and its
order or rita. Thus also in the Greek Heraclitus. "All things are
exchanged for fire."
But the fire process is conceived as being one with the digestive
process. Agni abides in the waters, "mingled with the essence of
water," and conducts process there.^^ Agni is "deposited in all
creatures" as the digestive process.^- But in this conception the
vedas bring us at once into the mental attitude of primitive man.
The core of the primitive conception of mana is conation, a wish,
an inner doing, of which the digestive process and the process of
combustion are main instances. Hence outward change presents
no difficulties as outward objects (perceptions) arise from an inner
real process. A man can just as well shapeshift into a werewolf;
a clansman can perfectly well be a crow or an eagle-hawk. The
same mana or inner doing is there. This is the crude form in
which it was first seen that percepts are sig)is for conation and con-
cepts are functional to the ends of urgency. The yam is eaten. Its
name or form passes away in digestion but its mana is appropriated.
So the bodies of any totems digest in the stomachs of the tribes-
men; but the totem-mana is, by this very shape-shifting of outer
forms, released to replenish the mana of the clan and so of all the
clans of the tribe.
Hence the Buddhist principle of becoming, of process observed
below the level of sense-perception by immediate empiricism; and
its derivation of "name and form," of perceived and conceived ob-
jects, from this real process, is not an original conception or method,
but is inherited from primitive man. Hence when the genius of
Schopenhauer, of James, and of Bergson regarded conation as the
key by which the cosmos is to be comprehended, they may be seen
to have pierced through the sophistication of the ages and achieved
the view, in one of its aspects, which completely naive experience
(immediate empiricism) first took of itself.
i"R. V. 1, 44, 14.
iiR. V. 1, 24, 20ff.
12R. V. 1, 7, 8; 1, 95, 2; 1, 31, 7. Cf. H. H. Wilson, Rig Veda Sanhita
R. V. 1, 59, note b and passim. He speaks of Agni as "fire or natural heat
of the stoniadi wliich is the principle element in digestion,'' Cf. also R. V.
1. 44, 2; 1, 56; 1, 36, 2; 1, 45, 6, where Agni as "bearer of oblations" renders
the sacrifice into food for the Gods as the digestive process does for man.
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But the emphasis upon process in the doctrine of dependent
origination is best seen to signify the reaction of Buddhism to a
more primitive view w^hen the notion of unity which accompanies
this emphasized process is remembered. No doubt James saw his
radical empiricism as identical with Buddhism not only because of
their similar grasp of observed process, but also because they both
repudiated any real unity in the individual self. But James did not
realize how deeply the principle of unity is involved in Buddhism
in spite of its doctrine of impermanence of self and thing. It was
unfortunate that he himself carried over from his famous onslaught
on the Absolute of the transcendentalists an animus against all in-
clusive unity. ^^
He recognizes of course that process involves unity, but the
unity he finds constituent of consciousness and given in experience
is one that issues in sense experience. Beyond such narrower, prag-
matic issue, in the sphere where ideas are not verifiable in this lim-
ited way of terminating in sense, they are accountable to the will
alone. Here comes in the famous doctrine of the "will to believe"
and of the "forced option." But by the force of the controversy in
which James was contending there was excluded any consideration
of a unity large enough for these latter realms of human experi-
ence and also given in experience itself which would then itself
"force the option," and thus reveal the intrinsic presence of intelli-
gence in will and feeling, not only as an external instrument, but as
the inward principle also of fulfilment or unity.
It is illuminating to observe what Gautama does in so similar
a philosophic situation, but with so different an animus. He ex-
cludes a unity that has grown strong in the epic struggle of the
Aryan invasion of India, namely, the unity of the individual. The
upanishadic movement had also come to the realization of this sub-
jective unity. But it may be said to be recognized to-day that an
objective unity is more primitive. Men were socially conscious be-
fore they were individually conscious.^^ And it is well known that
in the social consciousness, the total cosmos was included by early
man whether or not that inclusion is original or is, as Durkheimians
i^See the present writer's article on "Immediate Empiricism and Unity,
Journal of Philosophy Vol. XXX, No. 6, Mar. 16, 1933. Also "Neutralism and
Radical Empiricism," by C. V. Tower, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVIII,
p. 589.
^^Ci., e. g., W. Jerusalem, An Introduction to Philosophy, tr., C. F.
Sanders, p. 326,
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maintain, a projection of the social consciousness. The upanishadic
movement, in its vedanta tendency glories in a universal fusion,
now as Atman and, in the next breath, as Brahman, subjective and
objective unity alternating. In its sankhya tendency it sees the
prakrita, or stream of objective event, as existing for the sake of
the soul (purusha) and points to an original unity deeper than its
dualistic tendency. ^'' The purusha must see not the eddies in the
prakrita, or pradhana, but only the clear-surfaced stream, in which
it shall find itself reflected as complete unity. Thus individualism
as it arose in India's spiritual movement, was being made subordi-
nate to the ascetic ideal which Hindu life was taking on.
But Gautama in the long discipline of his powerful nature, came
to feel that the opposition between individualism and asceticism was
ineradicable. Begin with an admittedly real individualism and no
regimen can overcome it. He therefore taught that the ascription
of unity or permanence to the individual soul is the prime error of
desire or worldliness itself. The atman or purusha, when consid-
ered as permanent unity as it was universally in his day, fastens so
stoutly upon the separate individual and his special desires as to
block effectively the way of salvation.
In excluding this, however, the more primitive objective unity
was still maintained. Gautama did not repudiate Brahma ; although,
as to what constitutes it, he is non-committal as he must be when
both soul and thing are unreal. But a closer observation reveals
that there is an inevitable unity in Buddhism and a unity conceived,
as we shall find, in precisely the same way in the most primitive
world-view traceable. Just as in the Greek Heraclitus. a similar
flux or stream of dependent origination appeared in a unified cycle
which was interpreted as logos or reason; so with Gautama, when
soul and thing are both impermanent, what is real is tJie patJi^*^ and
the path is what we might call the bed of the world-C}cle. Of
course Xirvana^" is real, but Nirvana is simply the high-point in the
path, at which the deepest and most persistent aspect of the world,
namel}-, karma, ceases. Absolute unity obtains. Yet not quite ab-
solute, for a new multiplicity arises in a new flux through the cyclic
path. The inevitable nature of the path, through which a cycle
completes itself, is seen in the special means used in bringing all
'•'Cf. Hclvalkar and Ranadc, Ilistorx of Indian Philosophx, Vol. II. pp.
303 note, 307 f, 424, 425.
i"Visuddhi-Magga (chap. XVI), Warren, op. cit., p. 146.
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creatures to the four trances, in which retarded karma catches up,
when the end of a cycle is approaching.^'^ The whole path must be
covered.
The apparently inescapable unity, like that in early Greek phil-
osophy, stands aside wholly from any problem of knowledge, which
may be said to have disturbed the normal development of James'
mind. But the unity retained in Gautama is an immediate inheri-
tance from the primitive world. The concept of Brahma in its
primitive form is the ancient Indian form of mana and from the
beginning it appears as unity. ^^ It is true that we find different
individual things, a mana of this and a mana of that; and it is easy
for modern individualistic prejudice to jump to the conclusion that
we have here the conception at its source. But the fact which gives
mana its real significance is its superindividual and superparticular
nature, no matter how it may assume differing color, as it centers
in different particulars. The superindividual notion of responsi-
bility among all early men goes to the bottom of the matter. Alana
is always a superparticular focussing on a particular point. The
tension of the superindividual, binding all individuals and particu-
lars into a unity, is the escapeless notion. Not "substance," nor "dan-
ger-centering," nor "strangeness," is the definitive aspect of mana,
but rather its holding all particulars and individuals in proper place
in the unity of their tribal world.
We will here set down very briefly some illustrations of the
original force of the feeling of unity in the primitive mind. First,
the primitive attitude to death. It is simply nonsense that primi-
tive man conceived the continuation of life beyond death because
he childishly failed to mark the final nature of death's changes.^^
Modern science often blows both hot and cold in dealing with prim-
itive man. At one time his situation in the face of threatening death
is dramatically presented and the effect upon his imagination is
made to account for much. At another time it is held that he fails
to notice the changes which death entails and so his notion of con-
tinued life presents no problem. A better explanation is that a ten-
sion to unity is so immediately felt by early man that his tribe re-
I'^'Visuddhi-Magga (chap. XIII), Warren, op. cit., p. 322.
i^Cf. J. E. Harrison, Themis, p. 72; MM. Hubert et Mauss, Annee Social
VII. P. 116.
i^Cf. Cornford, op. cit., p. 161, note 3, quoting Levy-Bruhl, Fanct. ment.,
p. 358.
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mains a social life unbroken even by death that stalks him at every
turn.
The meaning of harma appears in this connection. When Bud-
dhism repudiated the permanence of the individual which primi-
tive man had not yet conceived, it was this persistent "inner do-
ing," or mana, that remained in karma, binding existence to exis-
tence across the divide of death, and persisting through tJic path to
the borders of nirz'afia. Up to this point, the "inner doing" has
been centered in particular ends. In nirvana it ceases, onl}- because
it is unified or referred to the whole. So Gautama feels that Brah-
ma, the objective unity, is not to be denied. \\'e find operative here
the same feeling of unity that makes death to primitive man only
a wavering in a unified course of life. Indeed karma is a concep-
tion that reveals unity as intrinsic to Buddhism as also to the prim-
itive world-view which Buddhism inherited. For karma is fully
understood only as the negative aspect of cosmic unity. When this
unity is denied in the seeming permanence or independence of the
particular, it draws painfully. Karma is the inner pull of cosmic
unity.
The force of the immediate feeling of unity in the primitive
mind is seen again in totemic classification. All objects that have
taken form and name in the life of totemic societies are classed
under the different totems.-" If anything is classed under a particu-
lar totem, its mana is only a focussing of the "totemic principle"
or mana of the totem which in turn is a more inclusive centering of
the total tribal cosmic mana. There is no individual conation but
it reaches out to a tcrfiimi quid which is the tensional unity of the
little tribal cosmos, itself.
Besides the superindividual responsibility, the deathless tribal
solidarity, and totemic classification, there is the fact that taboos are
not a matter of accumulation of interdictions, but their totality con-
stitutes a system with an inner unity, namely the negative ritual,
which again stands in organic relation with the positive ritual for
the total conservation of value, a matter which the present writer
has treated in another place.-^ If space permitted, much could be
said of the force of unity in the primitive world-view.
-"Cf . Durkheim ct Mauss, "Classifications primitives," Annec Social. VI
;
Durkhcim, op. cit. pp. 141 flf.
-•ly/u- Munist, July, 1933.
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When we seek to trace the form which unity first took in early
mind, we find the origin of the Buddhist cycle and of the Heracli-
tian logos. Mana, which as we have argued is process held in ten-
sion to unity—a cosmic unity of all pervading process—tends to
concentrate, permanently or occasionally, in sun, or storm, or moun-
tain-top, or social conflict. These potent centerings are sometimes
advantageous to the tribe and sometimes disadvantageous. The
same concentration may pass from good to evil, as the sun from
light and warmth to sun-stroke or a corrobori from a joy-feast to
a row. Good and evil are a first obvious division. It appears that
this division very early became fixed. The advantageous and dis-
advantageous focussings split the manistic cosmos into two consis-
tent parts. As far back as the time when the charms of the Athar-
van Veda were taking form, we find one kind of mana operated in
healing purposes and another in hostile practices (Atharva and An-
giras)." The American Iroquois distinguished orenda, operating
in religion, and oranda, operating in magic. Among the Arunta
and Loritja tribes in Australia, magic forces are distinguished as
arungquiltha from the mana of the tribal world which has already
taken the totemic divisions and resides in the churingas of the dif-
ferent totems.^^ By this time there had been perceived the obvious
division of the elements, earth, fire, air, and water.^^ Fire and air
were put with the good, as being light, warm, and dry, and earth
and water on the evil side as being dark, cold, and moist. Alale
and female fell also into the list of opposites. But through these
opposing series, process set up a cyclic motion, down on one side
and up on the other, in the Rita of India, and in the Tao of China
(the revolution of the yang and the yin). This form of unity is
also the logos of Heraclitus and the cycles of Gautama. ^-^
22Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 122.
23Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, tr. J. W. Swain, p. 197f
.
-"*Otto Gilbert, Meteorologische Theoricn d. Griech. Altertums, chap. I,
quoted in Cornford op. cit., p. 8.
25Cornford marks this as the dike form of unity and distinguishes another
form, that of moira in which the allotment of elements rather than the bal-
anced cycle was regulative. He suggests that these determined the difference
between the two main tendencies in early Greek philosophy, the Ionian and
the Eleatic, although borrowing each from each. But he finds, nevertheless,
the unity with which each movement started, in the pre-philosophic primitive
world. See the present writer's criticism of his derivation of unity in "Primi-
tive Mental Attitude and the Objective Study of Mind," Tlie Monist, July,
1933.
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From the view-point at which we have arrived, a synthesis of
the phenomena of the primitive world takes place of itself. The
widely dilTerent theories by which these phenomena are derived
from an earlier individualism alike appear as labored. Scholarship
has shown an inevitable disposition to trace all human origins to
atomism. Though the condition actually discovered everywhere in
early life is one in which individual and particular are almost sub-
merged under forces of widest scope, they must presuppose an
earlier individualism. After mana was discovered, when it became
evident that conation or wish or inner doing is the core of the con-
ception, scientific scholars have been confirmed in their atomistic
prejudices. There was first, it is held, a mana of this and a mana
of that and later came the unifying process. But just how this is
to be conceived is nowhere made clear.
It would not be difficult to explain why such a prejudice should
have arisen. In the first place, it is essentially the sense-empiri-
cist prejudice against original unity. We have attempted to show
the force of this feeling of unity in primitive mind. Nor are we
alone in such observation. Durkheim's faithful study could not
escape it. But we will return to this in a moment. It is precisely
this unity which stirs prejudice and prevents even its own recogni-
tion in most scholars. For the writers on anthropological matters
have been of the positivistic temper of sense-empiricism. They
have presupposed a gradual evolution from animal mind, solving
problems by reflective thinking. They have usually overlooked the
tension to inclusive unity in the magico-religious mental attitude of
primitive man and have regarded the whole episode as a crazy ab-
eration somehow to be explained away. On the other hand, the
philosophers of "the great tradition" have not expected to find an
ally, and especially not a corrective, in so backward a stage of de-
velopment. They have been too confident of their own position to
become alive to the evidence here of an inclusive unitv in mind im-
mediately given and ofl^ering a wholly empirical position on which
to establish the most significant position in their philosophy—that
of unity. They were too long content with a unity derived by way
of solution of the problem of knowledge or of the problem of sub-
stance, too readily accepting and using it as a basis for ardent specu-
laion withf)ut further urgency to probe to the "deep ground of the
given." The actual research in primitive anthropology was carried
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on by men given to the method of analysis and profoundly distrust-
ing all evidence of original unities.
Even Durkheim, when his thoroughgoing studies of primitive
man led to the necessary recognition of this fact of a tension to
unity in primitive mental attitude, felt himself under necessity to
derive this unity from a previous multiplicity. The profoundly
significant part he finds it playing, nevertheless, not only for prim-
itive, but also for all sociological phenomena, convinces him of its
reality. It is a being sui generis; it is a unity indissoluble; it yields
the forms of religion, ethics, and knowledge, and the force of all
progress. The inspiration of the master's writings and the enthu-
siasm of his followers both have their rise in this Durkheimian so-
cial unity, which was first discovered, in following out his method
of "historical criticism," in the mental attitude of primitive man.
Starting out with idealistic monism as a foil, Durkheim is moved
to inexhaustible enthusiasm when he discovers an empirical unity
large enough to form the basis of a sociological system of thought.
Nevertheless, by virtue of his positivistic heritage, he is obliged to
derive it from a previous multiplicity. It arose from an efferves-
cence in which individuals, previously held together in a horde by
merely mechanical bonds of similarity, after having first been sepa-
rated into lesser groups by some shock, are brewed into an organic
unity.^^ But since he makes mana first appear as social continuum,
logically, it should be conceived first as inclusive unity and later as
individualized. Indeed the derivation of a mana of this and a mana
of that under an original unity presents no difficulty. But this
school also reveals an inevitable tendency to go from the particu-
lar to the general, without however clearly working the matter out.-^
Indeed when Durkheim derives his society sui generis from previ-
ous individuals as such he asks what seems to the positive empiri-
cist an unanswerable question, "for whence could it otherwise
come ?"^^
There is another notable place where the retarding force of
^^La division dn travail.
27Durkheitn, throughout EJoii. Forms, speaks of the totemic principle, or
mana of the clan, as original and the inclusive mana of the tribe as derived
although much of his evidence points in the other direction. Compare also
Cornf ord's treatment of the matter : op. cit., p. 85.
28"Les representations individuelles et les representations sociales," Revue
Metaphysique (1898), p. 295.
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historic empiricism is seen in a spirit similarly sensitive to the sig-
nificance for philosophy of an indissoluble unity. We refer again
to the philosophy of William James, ^^'hen he found a complete
integration of interests guaranteed as an absolute moral standard
bv the presence of a sentiment sui goicris-^ he assumed that that
sentiment was derived through a process of judgement. He con-
sidered it merely as holding logically. That it should be the issue
of a unity given in mind lay beyond consideration.^"
We have now perhaps the means at hand to strengthen the sug-
gestion made in the introduction of this paper that immediate or
radical empiricism may turn out to be the view of common sense
not in its modern sophisticated form but in its primitive truly in-
genuous form. Since it was too naive for any animus, it may
prove itself a touchstone to empiricism in our own time. Imme-
diate empiricism, turning out to be identical with Buddhism in a
more complete way than James apprehended, may have to awaken
to its own immediate feeling of unity which Buddhism inherited
from the primitive world.
There certainly \vas a time when reflective mind emerged in
the planet and, how^ever much intra- and extra-organic factors may
have operated in its production,^^ it was a biological and not a so-
ciological event. It is a matter of heredity whatever may come to
be the ultimate conception of heredity. It would, of course,
be at first completely ingenuous, reacting to its situations faithfully,
according to its own inner form, w^ithout the slightest reflection on
its self or its methods. Now the mental attitude of non-civilized
man has perforce been studied by a thoroughly objective method,
observing his magico-religious beliefs and behavior. I say "per-
force" because w^e have only deposits from prehistoric periods ; and,
for our "savage" contemporaries, seldom a "philosopher" among
them has power to conceive the meaning inherent in the ways of
his people. This is because what gives their mental attitude a con-
sistent meaning, a meaning which determined the initial concep-
tions of historic philosophy in whatever land it occurred, is an in-
ner form, felt, or given in immediate empiricism, and not an overt
rational synthesis. One might say that there should be a warning
^^IVill to Believe ami Other Essays, p. 188.
^''"Moral Inwardness" by the present writer, The Moiiist, Jan. '32.
^'Cf. K. B. Holt, Animal Drizr and the Learning Process, chap. II, III,
IV. F. S. C. Northrop, Science and lurst Pri)icil'les, chap. IV.
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to present-day objective students of mind that unity gets its per-
sistency in philosophy, not merely from the escapeless presence
of the logical subject imputing its unity also to the objective world,
but from a deeper source,—in the fact that the conception of unity
initial in philosophy in every tradition is now by trust-worthy evi-
dence traced to the primitive world view. The natural presumption
would be that it is original there. In another place we have argued
that the attempted derivation of it from a primary multiplicity is
not successful. In this paper we have presented evidence that it is
given in feeling—in immediate perception.
Indeed it is sufficient to demonstrate, almost, the immediate per-
ception of unity in the mind to recall how, when the world was still
young and individualism was no such rank growth as in the mod-
ern world, a whole polytheism of individual gods was, under the
feeling of unity, fused into "henotheism," and the old primitive
unity of brahman, reinstated easily, became a metaphysical Abso-
lute. Similarly in Greece the individual gods were repudiated and
philosophy returned to cosmic unity—the all-water, the apeiron,
the number unity, the one fire. The Hebrews came quickly to a
conception of a social unity, the "Kingdom of God," and of a
moral cosmos.
Indeed it could be shown perhaps that, when in epic barbarism
the pole of multiplicity first began to assert itself powerfully as a
dominating individualism, the superior force of the feeling of unity
inherited in the rising schools of thought from the primal world,
so subordinated the particular and the individual, or closed them
out from consideration as real, that philosophy was started upon
the "high abstract path,"—an error, perhaps inescapable, but one
the correction of which has engaged the human spirit throughout
the history of philosophy. The acknowledgement of the two poles
of mind in mutual relation, multiplicity and unity, immediately
given to non-sensuous perception may be approaching. Thus will
be achieved the real basis or the inclusive form for the structure
of thought and of value. But this paragraph should be expanded
into a very long essay.
